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This study investigates if there is a positive association between takeover premiums 
and the bidder’s perception of target firm auditor reputation and independence.  Using 
auditor size as a proxy for auditor reputation, the results indicate that target 
shareholders receive a higher takeover premium when a Big 4 auditor audits the target 
firm in the year prior to the takeover announcement.  This result is only significant 
however in the period prior to the highly publicised audit failures.  The impact of 
perceived auditor independence on takeover premiums is studied using the levels and 
size of non-audit service (NAS) fees provided by the target firm auditor.  Using three 
proxies for auditor independence, the results do not show an association between 
perceived auditor independence and takeover premiums.  This finding is robust to 
partitioning the sample by auditor size, takeover hostility and splitting the sample into 
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1. Introduction 
The provision of non-audit services (NAS) by auditors to their clients received 
worldwide regulatory attention in the early 2000s, following various high-profile 
corporate collapses (e.g., Enron and WorldCom (US) and HIH Insurance (Australia)).  
Underpinning this regulatory reform is the belief that the provision of NAS reduces 
the quality of financial statements by impairing auditor independence.  As stated by 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission, “an auditor’s independence is impaired 
either when the accountant is not independent in fact, or when in light of all relevant 
facts and circumstances, a reasonable investor would conclude that the auditor would 
not be capable of acting without bias” (SEC 2000).  This comment highlights the two 
dimensions of auditor independence: “independence in fact” and “independence in 
appearance.”  Most prior research examining the impact of NAS has concentrated on 
the first dimension of auditor independence.  The conclusion from the majority of 
these studies is that NAS does not impair auditor independence (e.g., DeFond, 
Raghunandan and Subramanyam 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Hay, Knechel and 
Li, 2006).  However, much less attention has been devoted to the second dimension of 
auditor independence (exceptions include Glezen and Millar, 1985, Dopuch, King and 
Schwartz, 2003; Krishnan, Sami and Zhang, 2005; Francis and Ke, 2006). 
  
Building on the comment of the SEC, this paper examines whether the appearance of 
auditor independence impacts on the decisions made by investors.  The context used 
in this study is the premium offered by bidding firms in takeover offers for stock 
exchange listed targets.  After a company determines to make a takeover offer, the 
calculation of the offer price is a crucial decision.  Where the bidding firm (and its 
advisers) do not have access to private information about the target firm, the pricing 
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decision must be based on publicly available target firm financial information.  In 
these circumstances, it is expected that any doubt over target firm financial statement 
credibility will flow through to the premium offered.   As such, in corporate 
takeovers, the credibility and quality of financial statements attains a crucial 
importance, particularly as many target firms are relatively small entities with limited 
analyst following.  This context thus provides an interesting research setting to 
determine if the provision of NAS affects the perception of auditor independence and 
consequently, influences the premium offered by the acquiring firm.  Investigating 
this association in Australia is advantageous as fees received by auditors are a 
required disclosure.  Furthermore, as Australia is less litigious than the US, Australian 
auditors have less incentive to remain independent due to the lower concern that 
litigation will harm their reputation (Francis, 2006 and Gul, Tsui and Dhaliwal, 2006). 
 
Prior research is also extended by examining if target firms with auditors believed to 
have a superior reputation (i.e., Big 4) receive a higher takeover premium due to the 
perception of greater financial statement credibility.  Additionally, the study 
determines if this relationship was impacted by the highly publicised auditing failures 
that occurred in the early 2000’s. 
 
This study tests the hypotheses of a positive relationship between takeover premiums 
and the acquiring firm’s perception that the target firm auditor is reputable and has 
maintained their independence from the management of the target firm.   To test the 
reputation hypothesis, we separate target firm auditors using the traditional Big 4/non-
Big 4 framework.  The results are consistent with higher takeover premiums being 
paid to target firms engaging large auditors, particularly, in hostile takeovers.  This 
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finding is sensitive however to partitioning the sample pre- and post- the auditing 
failures that resulted in the increased regulation on the provision of NAS by auditors.  
In the period prior to 2002 there is a positive relationship between auditor size and 
takeover premiums.  However, after the well publicised auditing scandals the results 
indicate that large auditors are no longer associated with higher takeover premiums.  
This is consistent with a loss in reputation for the large auditing firms arising from the 
auditing failures. 
 
Using audit fee and NAS fee data for the target firm for the year prior to the takeover 
announcement; this paper measures the appearance of target firm auditor 
independence three ways.  Firstly, the ratio of NAS fees to total fees paid to the target 
auditor (RNASTOT) and secondly, the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees paid to the target 
auditor (RNASAUD). The final measure uses the natural logarithm of the NAS fee 
(LNNAS).  Inconsistent with NAS reducing the appearance of auditor independence 
and hence lowering the credibility of the target firm financial statements, the results 
for each measure of auditor independence is insignificant in explaining takeover 
premiums.  The insignificant results are not sensitive to partitioning the sample by 
takeover hostility or into takeovers that were announced before and after the auditing 
scandals.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses prior 
literature that allows the development of hypotheses that relate takeover premiums to 
auditor reputation and auditor independence.  The subsequent section discusses the 
research design and is followed by a description of the data collection process.  
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Section 5 presents the results of the auditor reputation and auditor independence 
hypotheses.  The final section of the paper provides a discussion and a conclusion.  
 
2. Takeover premiums and the role of the target firm auditor 
There is a substantial body of prior research across many countries that document 
significant premiums in corporate takeovers.  Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and 
Zutter (2008), for instance, shows that target shareholders in US takeovers receive 
abnormal returns of 30% around the announcement of a takeover.  Findings in other 
countries also indicate significant wealth gains to target shareholders.  Bugeja (2005) 
reports takeover premiums of 28% in Australia, whilst Constantinou, Trigeorgis and 
Vafeas (2005) find abnormal returns of 26% in hostile UK takeovers.  Various 
explanations have been proposed and tested to explain the size of takeover premiums.  
These include: synergies (e.g.. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Sudarsanam, Holl 
and Salami, 1996 and Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson, 2003), disciplining of inefficient 
or underperforming target management (e.g., Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003 and Harford, 
2003) and the differential tax treatment of alternative payment forms (e.g., Huang and 
Walkling, 1987; Draper and Paudyal, 1999 and Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinback and 
Walter, 2000).   
 
Raman, Shivakamur and Tamayo (2008) report a negative association between target 
firm earnings quality and takeover premiums in US negotiated bids and an 
insignificant finding in non-negotiated bids.  Their explanation of these findings is 
that information obtained in negotiations is likely to be more useful for targets with 
poor earnings quality than for those with high earnings quality.  Whether premiums 
are related to perceived higher quality target firm financial statements arising from the 
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target firm engaging an auditor that is perceived to be independent and reputable 
remains unexamined.  Louis (2005) studied the impact of acquiring firm auditor 
choice on acquiring firm abnormal returns around a takeover announcement.  The 
results indicate that bidding firms have higher returns when they are audited by a non-
Big 4 firm, particularly in the takeover of a privately owned target.  This finding is 
consistent with local auditors having an advantage in providing merger advice in 
smaller acquisitions. 
 
When determining the price to offer in a corporate acquisition, an acquiring firm is 
faced with information asymmetry over the “true value” of the target firm.  In the 
absence of access to internal target firm financial information, the bidder must rely on 
the externally produced target firm financial statements to assess target firm value.  It 
is expected that the degree of reliance on and confidence in this publicly available 
information will be influenced by the perceived quality of the financial statements.  
As the function of an auditor is to attest to the financial statement information, this 
study argues that a greater level of credibility will be added to the target firm financial 
report when the target auditor is perceived by the acquiring firm to have a better 
reputation and have a higher level of independence. 
 
As audit reputation is not directly observable, prior research generally uses auditor 
size and brandname as an indicator of auditor reputation and quality.  The use of size 
as a proxy for audit quality is advocated by DeAngelo (1981).  She argues that as 
larger audit firms have a greater potential loss of client specific quasi-rents from 
breaching audit independence they have a greater ability to perform their duties free 
of the influence of management.  Size may also be a good proxy for quality because 
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large auditors have an incentive to protect their investment in brandname and 
reputation (Klein and Leffler, 1981 and Shapiro, 1983).  The findings of prior 
research (Francis, 1984; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and 
Simon, 1987 and Gist, 1992) of an audit fee premium being paid to large auditors is 
typically interpreted as being consistent with such auditors providing a higher quality 
product and earning a return on their brandname investment. 
 
Previous research that has examined the outcomes of the audit process is also 
consistent with large firms providing higher quality audits.  For example, prior studies 
indicate that large auditors have a lower incidence of litigation (Palmrose, 1988)1 and 
are associated with lower underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs) (Balvers, 
McDonald and Miller, 1988 and Beatty, 1989).  The evidence of significantly lower 
underpricing in IPO’s where larger auditors are employed is consistent with these 
auditors adding to the credibility of the financial information provided in the 
prospectus.  Chang, Gygax, Oon and Zhang (2008) however find greater underpricing 
in Australian IPO’s when a large auditor is used.  They interpret this result as 
indicating that the use of a quality auditor signals a higher after-market value of the 
newly listed firm.  Also, in the context of IPO’s, Menon and Williams (1991) find that 
the majority of auditor changes are to a large firm, consistent with such auditors 
increasing financial statement credibility.  Menon and Williams also report that 
underwriters increase fees to clients in firm commitment IPO’s if a non-Big 8 auditor 
is used, consistent with greater underwriter risk associated with lower financial 
statement quality.  Further, Lee, Stokes, Taylor and Walter, (2003) show that firms 
                                                 
1 Inconsistent results are obtained by Lys and Watts (1994).  They find the probability of litigation is 
not associated to audit firm size. 
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that voluntarily provide earnings forecasts in their prospectus are more likely to use a 
high quality auditor.  
 
Where an auditor provides NAS to their audit clients, it is argued that cost savings 
arising from knowledge spillovers create an economic bond between client and 
auditor (Simunic, 1984; Beck, Frecka and Solomon 1988).  It is commonly contended 
that this economic dependence of an auditor on their client results in the auditor being 
more willing to compromise their independence and acquiesce to the will of 
management.  This of course assumes that the costs of breaching independence (e.g., 
litigation and loss of reputation) are less than the benefits of retaining the client.  
Additionally, it is also claimed that as NAS provide a greater financial return, auditors 
will not want to take actions that jeopardise this lucrative revenue stream.  For 
example, Arthur Levitt, the chairman of the US SEC, stated, “the audit function is 
simply being used as a springboard to more lucrative consulting services” (Levitt, 
2000). 
 
Research investigating the output of financial reporting, however, has generally been 
unable to consistently document that auditors’ independence “in fact” is impaired by 
higher amounts of NAS.  For example, prior studies document no association between 
the likelihood of auditor qualifications and NAS (Barkess and Simnett, 1994; 
Craswell, 1999; Craswell, Stokes and Laughton, 2002; DeFond, Raghunandan and 
Subramanyam 2002 and Hay, Knechel and Li, 2006)2 and audit tenure and NAS 
(DeBerg, Kaplan and Pany, 1991; Barkess and Simnett, 1994 and Hay, Knechel and 
                                                 
2 Contrary evidence is found in Wines (1994). 
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Li, 2006).3  Further, although Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) document an 
association between NAS and both the frequency of reporting a small earnings 
surprise and discretionary accruals, the results of the study have been found to be 
sensitive to research design in later studies (Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003; 
Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Larcker and Richardson, 2004 and Reynolds, Deis and 
Francis, 2004).  Cahan, Emanuel, Hay and Wong (2008) find no association in New 
Zealand between discretionary accruals and either NAS growth rates or the length of 
time a client has purchased NAS.  Their results however suggest there is an increase 
in discretionary accruals when a client is important to the auditor and either NAS fees 
are increasing quickly or the client has a longer history of purchasing NAS from the 
auditor.  Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) examine the association between 
financial report restatements and NAS fees and document a positive relationship only 
for unspecified NAS fees.  Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor (2006) show that NAS fees 
are unrelated to earnings conservatism. 
  
To date, the majority of studies examining auditor independence have focused on 
investigating whether NAS has impaired actual auditor independence.  Typically, 
however, regulators focus not only on “independence in fact” but “independence in 
appearance.”  This second aspect of auditor independence has, however, received less 
attention in prior research.  Glezen and Millar (1985) examine whether the disclosure 
of NAS fees influences auditor approval rates.  Inconsistent with NAS reducing the 
appearance of independence, the results show no association between auditor 
approval rates and the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees.  Gul, Tsui and Dhaliwal (2006) 
and Krishnan, Sami, Zhang (2005) find that a firm’s earnings response coefficient 
                                                 
3 Beck, Frecka and Solomon (1988) present inconsistent results and find auditor tenure is significantly 
greater where auditors provide ongoing NAS. 
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(ERC) is inversely related to the level of NAS fees provided by a firm’s auditor for 
Australia and the US respectively.  Francis and Ke (2006) similarly report that firms 
with high levels of NAS have a lower ERC with the result driven by firms with high 
accruals.  Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2003), using an experimental setting, find that 
the disclosure of NAS impacts on the appearance of auditor independence even where 
the facts suggest the auditor is independent in fact.    
 
Studies assessing the impact of the collapse of Enron on other audit clients of Arthur 
Andersen have produced mixed findings.  Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou (2006) find 
that Andersen’s other audit clients experience significant negative abnormal returns 
around the indictment of Andersen in March 2002 and that these negative returns are 
greater for those firms that purchased higher NAS.  On the other hand, although 
Chaney and Philipich (2002) find that Andersen’s other clients exhibited significant 
negative abnormal returns around the disclosure in January 2002 that Andersen had 
shredded a number of documents following the Enron failure, the abnormal return is 
not associated with the level of NAS provided by Andersen. 
 
Despite a lack of conclusive research findings that document NAS fees impinge on 
auditor independence, corporate regulators worldwide have moved to provide greater 
controls over the provision of NAS by auditors and there have been calls to prohibit 
the provision of NAS by a firm’s auditor (e.g., Francis, 2004).  For example, the US 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act legislated in 2002 prohibited the provision of certain types of 
services by auditors to their audit client (e.g., internal control) and requires that other 
NAS provided by the firm’s auditor must be approved by an organisation’s audit 
committee.  In Australia, audit reforms were put in place in 2004 following CLERP 
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Issue Paper 9 “Corporate Disclosure – Strengthening the Financial Reporting 
Framework.”  The reforms include requirements for auditor partner rotation and a 
restriction on auditors taking management positions with a former client.  
Additionally, the professional accounting bodies issued “Professional statement F1 – 
professional independence” which required that that an auditor evaluates threats posed 
to their independence by NAS and the prohibition of the provision of that NAS where 
the threat cannot be reduced to an acceptable level.  The UK also introduced various 
changes to auditor independence rules despite there being no high profile corporate 
collapses arising from audit failures.  These reforms are described in Fearnley and 
Beattie (2004). 
 
Where an acquiring firm is completing its valuation of a target firm, they are likely to 
discount the price where the target firm financial statements are perceived to have less 
reliability.  Given the role of the target auditor in adding to financial statement 
credibility, it is expected that takeover premiums will be related to the bidder’s 
perception of both auditor independence and auditor reputation.  The prior literature 
on auditor reputation indicates that target firm financial statements will have greater 
perceived credibility when a large auditor audits the firm.  Additionally, previous 
studies and regulatory concerns over the impact of NAS on the appearance of auditor 
independence suggest that the perceived quality of financial statements will be 
reduced when an auditor provides an increasing amount of NAS to an audit client.    
This leads to the two hypotheses tested in this study: 
 
H1: Takeover premiums are negatively related to the amount of NAS provided by the 
target firm auditor; 
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H2: Takeover premiums are positively related to the size of the target firm auditor. 
 
3. Research design 
All takeovers for Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed firms from 1996 to 2006 
are identified from the Connect 4’s Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  This search 
identified 593 takeovers.  The exact announcement date of the takeover was found by 
searching through announcements made to the ASX available on Huntley’s Aspect 
FinAnalysis database.  It was necessary to exclude takeovers that had insufficient 
information available to estimate model (1) (described below), leaving 549 takeovers 
in the final sample.  A temporal distribution of the sample partitioned by takeover 
outcome is provided in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
There is no discernible trend in takeover activity with the number of takeovers at their 
highest in the first and last year of the sample.  Across the entire sample, 
approximately 67% of offers are completed with a successful deal.  It is noticeable, 
however, that success rates vary across years.  For example, in 2005, 86% of 
takeovers succeed compared to 53% in 2000.   
 
Takeover premiums (Prem) are defined as the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
over the period commencing 60 days prior to the takeover announcement and ending 
30 days afterwards.  The Core Research Database maintained by the Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) was used to source target firm 
share prices.  A zero-one market model is used to calculate BHARs with the return on 
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the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index used as the reference market return.  The 
standard market model is not employed to estimate abnormal returns as the low 
volume of trading of target firms in the pre-takeover period reduces the ability to 
estimate beta.  The results are unlikely to be impacted by this methodological 
approach as Brown and Warner (1985) document that the power of the zero-one 
model to identify abnormal returns is similar to the standard market model. 
The testing of hypothesis one requires a proxy for the appearance of target firm 
auditor independence (AUDINDEP).  If target firm auditor independence is an issue 
for the acquiring firm, then an assessment of independence is likely to be conducted 
using the NAS fee disclosures of the target firm.  As stated by Ashbaugh, LaFond and 
Mayhew (2003), the perception of independence as viewed by regulators and the 
general public is more likely to be captured by the fee ratio than total fees paid by a 
firm to an auditor at either the audit firm level or audit office level.  The first two 
measures of auditor independence are variants of the fee ratio commonly used in 
earlier research.  Following prior studies, the first proxy of auditor independence takes 
the ratio of NAS fees to total fees (RNASTOT) for the year prior to the takeover 
announcement.  The second proxy is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees (RNASAUD) 
for the year preceding the announcement of the takeover.  The final measure of 
auditor independence is the natural logarithm of the NAS fee (LNNAS).  If higher 
NAS fees impair the appearance of auditor independence, then the effect will be a 
decline in financial statement credibility and a reduction in the takeover premium.  
Hypothesis 1, therefore, predicts a negative coefficient on the three auditor 
independence measures.  Audit and NAS fees are a required disclosure in Australia 
for the entire sample period.  The fee data is hand collected from the target firm 
financial statements sourced from Huntley’s Aspect FinAnalysis database. 
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Hypothesis 2 is tested using an indicator variable that denotes target firms audited by 
a large auditor (AUDREP).4  The identity of the auditor for the year preceding the 
takeover announcement is collected from the target firm financial report.  It is 
predicted that AUDREP will enter the regression with a positive coefficient.5 
 
The credibility of the financial statements will be reduced where the auditor has 
issued a qualified audit opinion.  A dummy variable (QUALIFIED) is used to indicate 
takeovers where the target auditor issued a qualified audit opinion on the financial 
statements for the year prior to the takeover.  As a control for target firm earnings 
quality (EARNQUAL) we use the ratio of cash flows from operations to profit after tax 
measured for the financial year preceding the takeover announcement. 
 
Takeover premiums have been extensively researched in earlier studies and have 
identified a number of additional variables that need to be controlled for in a model of 
takeover premiums.  Cash takeover offers have been documented to be associated 
with increased takeover premiums (see: Huang and Walkling, 1987; Franks, Harris 
and Mayer, 1988; Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinback and 
Walter, 2000 and Bugeja, 2005).  Method of payment (PAYT) is controlled using an 
indicator variable that denotes takeovers where the initial takeover consideration is 
exclusively cash.  The payment type is identified from takeover documents lodged by 
the bidder with the ASX.  The attitude of target firm management to the takeover bid 
                                                 
4 Over the period of this study (i.e., 1996 to 2006), the number of large auditing firms decreased from 
six to four following the merger of Coopers and Lybrand with Price Waterhouse in 1997 and the 
demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002.   The AUDREP variable is coded as one for target firms audited by 
any of these audit firms. 
5 As the purpose of this study is to focus on whether the appearance of auditor independence and 
reputation influence takeover premiums we do not include measures of actual auditor quality or 
independence (e.g., discretionary accruals or the rate of client audit report qualifications by audit firm).  
Instead we focus on measures of independence and reputation easily observable by an investor. 
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is captured using the initial recommendation of the target firm board to shareholders.  
Takeovers where the recommendation is to accept the offer are highlighted using a 
dummy variable (FRIENDLY).  The recommendation is collected from the Target 
Statement lodged with the ASX by the target firm. 
 
The Bidders Statement lodged with the ASX is used to determine the bidding firm 
toehold interest (TOEHOLD) in the target at the date of the takeover announcement.  
As argued by Stulz (1988), offerors with a higher initial interest need to deal with less 
external shareholders to complete the acquisition and can offer a lower premium.  
Stulz, Walkling and Song (1990), Bugeja and Walter (1995) and Sudarsanam, Holl 
and Salami (1996) find results consistent with this prediction for the US, Australia 
and UK respectively.  Competing takeover offers for a target firm are identified using 
an indicator variable coded as one (MULTIPLE) where there is more than one 
simultaneous bidder for the target. 
 
Following the approach of Schwert (2000), we control for risk by adding target firm 
leverage to the model.  Leverage is measured using the target firm debt-to-equity ratio 
(DE) at the financial year-end prior to the takeover announcement.  Target firm 
performance is included in the model using the firm’s return on equity (ROE) for the 
year before the takeover.  The market-to-book ratio (MB) of the target firm measured 
two months before the takeover announcement is included to control for target firm 
growth prospects.  We also include the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of 
the target firm (TGTSIZE) at the financial year preceding the takeover as a control for 
size.  Prior research is inconclusive with target size negatively related to takeover 
premiums in Australia (Anderson, Haynes and Heaney, 1994) and insignificant in the 
US (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009).  
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The full model estimated is: 
 
PREMi = i + 1AUDINDEPi + 2AUDREPi + 3QUALIFIEDi + 4EARNQUALi + 
5PAYTi + 6FRIENDLYi + 7TOEHOLDi + 8MULTIPLEi + 9DEi + 10ROEi + 
11MBi + 12TGTSIZEi  + i         (1) 
 
where AUDINDEP is defined alternately as: 
 
 RNASTOT Ratio of NAS fees to total fees paid to the target firm auditor 
RNASAUD Ratio of NAS fees to audit fees paid to the target firm auditor 
LNNAS Natural log of NAS fees 
 
To control for heteroskedasticity all reported t-statistics from estimating the takeover 
premium model are based on White’s (1980) consistent covariance estimator. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables incorporated into model (1).  
Consistent with earlier studies, target shareholders receive significant positive 
abnormal returns around the announcement of a takeover with the mean and median 
BHARs being 27% and 23% respectively.  On average, NAS fees are 34% of the total 
fee received by the target firm auditor.  This statistic is slightly higher than the ratio of 
29% reported in the Australian study by Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor (2006).  The 
statistics for RNASAUD indicate that the average fee paid for NAS is approximately 
equal to the audit fee, raising the possibility that financial statement users may 
perceive an impairment of audit independence.  However, NAS fees have a wide 
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range relative to audit fees, ranging from zero to being over twelve times as large.  
Big 4 auditors are engaged by 75% of target firms. 
 
The results on the control variables show that in 67% of takeovers the consideration 
offered is exclusively cash.  Competing bidders are present in 25% of takeovers and 
the target firm board recommends bid acceptance in just over half of the takeover 
contests.  The statistics for return on equity are skewed to the left with the median and 
mean 5% and 0% respectively.  Approximately 8% of target firms are issued with a 
qualified audit report in the year prior to the takeover. 
 
5. Results 
Correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variables included in 
model (1) are presented in Table 3.  The correlation between takeover premiums and 
the three measures of auditor independence do not support Hypothesis 1.  The only 
significant correlation (LNNAS) is positive and not the predicted negative sign.  As 
expected, there is a high degree of correlation between the three measures of auditor 
independence.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2 the correlation between the takeover 
premium and auditor reputation is positive and significant.  There is a significant 
positive correlation between the use of large audit firms and the three auditor 
independence measures.  Target firm size is also positively correlated with the use of 
Big 4 auditors and the purchase of NAS.  Interestingly, the use of a reputable auditor 
is positively correlated with the payment of cash consideration.  A possible 
interpretation of this result is that target firm financial statements audited by reputable 
auditors have greater credibility resulting in the bidder having more confidence to 
offer cash as they are more certain to the value of the target firm.   This explanation is 
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consistent with the information asymmetry models of Hansen (1987) and Fishman 
(1989). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Although there is significant correlation between various control variables, the size of 
the correlation indicates that multicollinearity will not be a problem with the 
estimation of model (1) (Gujarati, 1995).    As found in prior literature, takeover 
premiums are significantly higher where cash is offered as consideration.  Takeover 
premiums are negatively correlated with the issue of a qualified audit report.  The 
issue of a qualified audit report is less likely when the auditor is a Big 4 firm and the 
target firm is large.  The results also show that a higher acquiring firm toehold is 
significantly correlated with friendly acquisitions, cash payment and a single bidder 
takeover. 
 
The results of estimating the regression model of takeover premiums are presented in 
Table 4.  Given the significant correlation between the various audit independence 
measures reported in Table 3, the model is estimated separately for each measure of 
audit independence.6  The test of Hypothesis 1, which uses sequentially each proxy 
for audit independence, is shown in columns (1) through (3).  The results provide no 
support for Hypothesis 1 with each coefficient being insignificant.  The findings from 
testing Hypothesis 2 are presented in column (4).  The coefficient on the large auditor 
dummy variable is positive and significant, indicating that target shareholders receive 
an addition return of 6.5% where a reputable auditor audits the target firm.  Target 
                                                 
6 The conclusion from the results are unchanged if the two hypotheses are tested simultaneously in the 
one model using in turn each auditor independence variable. 
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firm size is positively related to target firm abnormal returns in columns (1) and (2).  
When the auditor reputation variable is incorporated into the model target size is 
insignificant.  No relationship is found between takeover premiums and either the 
proxy for earnings quality or the audit report qualification dummy. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Confirming the results of prior studies, target shareholders receive higher abnormal 
returns when they are offered cash consideration and when the bidding firm has a 
lower toehold.  The nature of the takeover (i.e., hostile vs friendly) is unrelated to 
takeover premiums.  Three of the target firm financial variables report significant 
coefficients in Table 4.  Target firm abnormal returns are positively related to the 
target firm debt-to-equity ratio and negatively associated with the target firm return on 
equity and market-to-book ratios.  The negative impact of market-to-book is 
consistent with bidders offering a lower premium when the value of the target 
represents growth options, as the potential for overpayment is higher in these 
circumstances.  The positive relationship between takeover premiums and target firm 
leverage is consistent with the models in Israel (1991) and Israel (1992) and the 
results in Raad, Ryan and Sinkey (1999). 
 
5.1 Additional analysis 
Friendly vs hostile takeovers 
In a friendly acquisition, the target firm frequently provides the bidding firm with 
permission to conduct ‘due diligence.’  For example, in the friendly takeover bid for 
Qantas Airways Ltd by Airline Partners Australia, Qantas indicates in its Target 
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Statement “the Board granted due diligence and management access to the consortium 
investors after obtaining confidentiality undertakings.”7  In these circumstances, the 
bidding firm needs to rely less on the target firm auditors to add to financial statement 
credibility.  As a result, it is expected that the effects of Hypothesis 1 and 2 will be 
greatest in hostile takeovers.  To test if this is the case the sample is partitioned by the 
recommendation of the target firm board and model (1) re-estimated after excluding 
the director recommendation dummy variable (i.e., FRIENDLY).  The results are 
given in Table 5.  Panel A provides the results for friendly takeovers, whilst Panel B 
provides the findings in hostile bids.  The regression model is again estimated 
separately using each of the auditor independence variables. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Once more the results provide no support for Hypothesis 1 with insignificant findings 
on the three proxies of auditor independence in both the reject and accept sub-
samples.  If financial statement credibility is decreased by the provision of greater 
NAS, this effect should have been at its highest in hostile takeovers.  The results, 
however, provide no evidence that NAS influences the premium offered. 
 
A comparison of Panels A and B of Table 5 shows that the impact of auditor 
reputation is only significant in hostile takeovers.  This finding indicates that where 
bidders are unable to make their own assessment on financial statement credibility 
(i.e., hostile bids); the reputation of the target firm auditor provides some degree of 
reassurance when making their pricing decision.  The audit qualification variable is 
                                                 
7 Qantas Airways Limited, Target Statement, p 13.  Available on the ASX website: 
http://www.asx.com.au 
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insignificant irrespective of the attitude of the target firm board.  Although the 
earnings quality measure is significant in both sub-samples it is positively related to 
takeover premiums in friendly bids and negatively associated when the target board 
recommends rejection.  These findings are inconsistent with the US findings in 
Raman, Shivakamur and Tamayo (2008) who report a negative association between 
earnings quality and takeover premiums in negotiated deals.  A possible interpretation 
of our findings is that in friendly takeovers the bidder through due diligence is able to 
substantiate the level of earnings quality and is willing to pay a higher premium due 
to the lower risk of earnings being realised as cash flows post- takeover.  In contrast, 
in hostile bids as the bidding firm cannot access the records of the target firm it 
discounts the value of high quality earnings due to its inability to verify the accuracy 
of the information.8 
 
The association between takeover premiums and both target leverage and market-to-
book ratio are consistent with those presented in Table 4 using the complete sample.  
Interestingly the results and significance on a number of the other control variables 
differ between hostile and friendly bids.  In friendly takeovers there is a negative 
association between target firm profitability and takeover premiums.  Target firm 
performance however is insignificant in hostile bids.  Further, in hostile bids takeover 
premiums are higher in takeovers where: cash is offered as payment, the bidder has a 
lower toehold and the target firm is larger.  These variables are however insignificant 
in friendly takeovers.  The results in Henry (2005) provide a partial explanation for 
the difference in results across the recommendation of the target firm board.  That 
                                                 
8 These findings for the earnings quality measure must be interpreted in the light of the unsophisticated 
measure of earnings quality employed in this study.  As assessing the association between earnings 
quality and takeover premiums is not the primary purpose of this study we leave it to further research 
to examine the relationship between more sophisticated earnings quality measures (e.g., Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002) and takeover premiums. 
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study finds that accept recommendations in Australian takeovers are significantly 
more likely when equity is offered as payment and the acquiring firm has a higher 
toehold.  It is therefore expected that the impact on premiums of cash payment and 
low toeholds will be higher in the reject sub-sample. 
 
Pre- and post- increased audit failures 
The spectacular audit failures that occurred in the early 2000s led to a wave of new 
regulation in many countries that placed restrictions on the provision of NAS by 
auditors.  It is likely that these audit failures both damaged the reputation of large 
accounting firms and highlighted the potential independence issues resulting from the 
provision of NAS.  If these highly publicised audit failures focused bidding firms on 
the amount of NAS provided by target auditors the greatest negative effect of NAS on 
takeover premiums will be found in takeovers subsequent to the audit failures.  
Furthermore, the perception that large audit firms had a superior reputation is likely to 
have been significantly tarnished following the adverse publicity surrounding these 
high profile audit failures.  As a result of this tarnished brandname it is possible that 
bidding firms would no longer be willing to pay an additional premium for target 
firms audited by a Big 4 auditor. 
 
To test whether the results of testing the two hypotheses are sensitive to whether the 
takeover was announced before or after the auditing scandals, the sample was 
partitioned into takeovers announced before 2002 and those announced from 2002 
onwards.  Model (1) was estimated separately for each group and the findings are 
presented in Table 6.  The results pre- and post- the audit scandals are in Panels A and 
B respectively. 
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE  
 
Once again there is no support for Hypothesis 1 with all three measures of auditor 
independence insignificant both before and after 2002.  The impact of auditor 
reputation on takeover premiums, however, is sensitive to the time period during 
which the takeover is announced.  Prior to the regulatory reforms bidding firms paid 
an additional 4% premium where the target firm was audited by a Big 4 firm.  In 
contrast, subsequent to the regulatory changes the audit reputation variable is 
insignificant.  This result indicates that in the ‘minds’ of bidding firms the audit 
scandals diminished the reputation of the large auditing firms to the extent that the 
financial statements of their auditees were no more credible than those of other 
auditors.  For the control variables it is interesting to note that multiple bidders, target 
firm size and a lower toehold result in significantly higher abnormal returns only in 
the earlier time period, whilst return on equity is only significant post- 2001. 
 
5.2 Sensitivity tests 
Deletion of zero NAS observations 
Approximately 12.8% of target firms do not purchase any NAS from their auditors.  
To assess if the lack of a significant finding on the auditor independence measures 
arises from the inclusion of these observations, model (1) is estimated after deleting 
those firms that do not purchase any NAS.  The results (not tabulated) are 
qualitatively unchanged from those shown in Table 4, although the target firm 
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market-to-book ratio is no longer significant.  The coefficients on the auditor 
independence variables remained insignificant.9 
 
Target firms with ‘high’ NAS fees 
To determine if auditor independence concerns only impacts on takeover premiums 
when NAS fees are relatively high, the sample is partitioned at the median for each of 
the proxies for auditor independence.  Model (1) is then estimated for each proxy 
using only those observations above the median.  The results (not tabulated) showed 
negative coefficients on each auditor independence proxy, the t-statistics were not 
significant, however, at conventional levels.10 
 
Large vs small auditors 
To examine if the effect of NAS on the appearance of auditor independence differs 
between Big4/non-Big 4 auditors, the sample was partitioned by auditor size and 
model (1) estimated for each group.  For both types of auditor, the results for all three 
measures of auditor independence were insignificant. 
 
Identical auditors 
Where the same auditor audits the target and bidding firm it is expected that the 
acquiring firm will be more confident of the level of credibility of the target firm 
financial statements.  To examine if having an identical auditor impacts on takeover 
                                                 
9 Similar to the approach reported in Tables 5 and 6 the sample with non-zero NAS fees was also 
partitioned by the recommendation of the target board and announcement date and the model estimated 
for each grouping.  The coefficients on RNASTOTAL, RNASAUDIT and LNNAS were insignificant in 
each of the models estimated. 
10 The sample was also partitioned into quartiles for each of the auditor independence variables and the 
takeover premium model was estimated for the highest quartile.  The coefficients on the auditor 
independence measures continued to be insignificant. 
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premiums model (1) was re-estimated including an additional dummy variable 
denoting identical auditors.  The coefficient on this variable was insignificant.11 
 
Different auditor quality between target and bidder 
Subsequent to a successful takeover most target firms will engage the auditor of the 
acquiring firm (Firth, 1999).  If target firms share prices are discounted because of the 
lower quality of auditor it is possible that target firms audited by a small auditor will 
experience higher abnormal returns when it receives a takeover from a bidder with a 
large auditor.  To test this conjecture we re-estimated model (1) after including a 
dummy variable denoting takeovers where the acquiring firm engages a large auditor 
and the target firm uses a small auditor.12  This variable was insignificant.13 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
Corporate regulators worldwide have acted in recent years to address concerns that 
the provision of NAS by auditors to their audit clients has impaired auditor 
independence.  This action has been taken despite a lack of conclusive research 
evidence that NAS impairs auditor independence “in fact.”  This study extends this 
line of research by assessing if NAS impairs the “appearance” of auditor 
independence, as this second dimension of auditor independence is of concern to 
regulators but has received less attention in academic research.  The context used in 
this study to assess the impact of NAS on the appearance of auditor independence is 
the takeover of a publicly listed company as this involves a major corporate 
investment decision.  The results presented show no association between NAS fees 
                                                 
11 To conduct this additional estimation is was necessary to exclude 233 takeovers where the bidding 
firm was not listed.  Of the remaining 316 takeovers identical auditors were present in 67 (21%). 
12 This analysis was conducted only on those takeovers where the bidding firm was listed on the ASX. 
13 We also tested using a dummy variable if targets earned lower abnormal returns if they had a Big 4 
auditor and the acquiring firm had a non-Big 4 auditor.  The result was insignificant. 
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paid by the target firm to their auditor and takeover premiums.  This finding indicates 
that bidding firms do not believe that higher NAS impacts financial statement quality 
and credibility or, if it does; the reduction in credibility is insufficient to influence 
their pricing decision.  It is left to subsequent research to assess if this finding is 
robust in other countries.  Future research can also investigate whether higher NAS 
fees influence investors’ decisions and actions in other contexts and whether the level 
of sophistication of the investor perhaps drives any influence. 
 
This study also analysed if target firms with an auditor with a better reputation 
received a higher takeover premium due to the perceived greater financial statement 
credibility.  The results indicated that takeover premiums are significantly higher 
when a large auditor audits the target firm.  This result however is only significant in 
the period prior to the corporate failures that occurred in the early part of this century.  
This finding is consistent with the accounting scandals of the early 2000s tarnishing 
the reputation of the large auditor firms to the extent that the credibility of target firm 
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Table 1 
Time distribution of sample 
Takeovers announced for ASX listed targets between 1996 and 2006 are identified from the Connect 4 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  The year of takeover refers to the year in which the takeover was 







1996 44 17 61 
1997 32 7 39 
1998 35 18 53 
1999 30 17 47 
2000 31 27 58 
2001 32 18 50 
2002 26 18 44 
2003 33 16 49 
2004 26 15 41 
2005 32 5 37 
2006 47 23 70 





Descriptive statistics for the variables included in model (1).  PREM is the BHAR over the event 
window (-60,+30) days around the takeover announcement.  Auditor independence is measured using 
three variables taking fee data collected for the year preceding the takeover announcement: RNASTOT 
is the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, RNASAUD is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the 
natural logarithm of NAS fees.  AUDREP is a binary variable highlighting firms audited by a Big 4 
auditor.  QUALIFIED is an indicator variable noting target firms that received a qualified audit report 
for the financial year prior to the takeover, PAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is 
exclusively cash, FRIENDLY is an indicator variable set to 1 if the directors recommend bid acceptance 
and MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target firm.  
TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the 
takeover.  The following variables are measured as at the financial year-end before the bid 
announcement: EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow from operations to net profit after tax, TGTSIZE is 
the target firm’s market capitalisation, DE is the target firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target 
firm’s return on equity ratio and MB is the target firm’s market-to-book ratio.   
 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std Dev 
PREM 0.2729 
 
0.2300 2.6000 -1.1670 0.3755 
RNASTOT 0.3442 0.3202 0.9247 0.0000 0.2404 
RNASAUD 0.9170 0.4710 12.2800 0.0000 1.3846 
LNNAS 9.5123 10.6690 15.5244 0.0000 3.9358 
AUDREP 0.7557 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4299 
QUALIFIED 0.0841 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2778 
EARNQUAL 1.5795 0.8294 243.2424 -92.9231 13.3303 
PAYT 0.6737 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4684 
FRIENDLY 0.5134 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4998 
TOEHOLD 0.1687 0.1272 0.9759 0.0000 0.2121 
MULTIPLE 0.2462 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4299 
DE 1.2854 0.7243 77.0492 -8.1130 4.8934 
ROE -0.0071 0.0541 41.1950 -24.7437 2.1900 
MB 2.6947 1.2369 218.4145 -2.7197 13.5685 




Correlation Coefficients and two-tailed p-values for the dependent and independent variables in the takeover premium model 
Correlation coefficients for the variables in model (1).  PREM is the BHAR over the event window (-60,+30) days around the takeover announcement.  Auditor independence is 
measured using three variables taking fee data collected for the year preceding the takeover announcement: RNASTOT is the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, RNASAUD is the ratio of 
NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural logarithm of NAS fees.  AUDREP is a binary variable highlighting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED is an indicator 
variable noting target firms that received a qualified audit report for the financial year prior to the takeover, PAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is exclusively 
cash, FRIENDLY is an indicator variable set to 1 if the directors recommend bid acceptance and MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target 
firm.  TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover.  The following variables are measured as at the financial year-end 
before the bid announcement: EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow from operations to net profit after tax, TGTSIZE is the target firm’s market capitalisation, DE is the target firm’s 
debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target firm’s return on equity ratio and MB is the target firm’s market-to-book ratio.  Pearson correlations are below the diagonal and Spearman is 
above. 
 
 PREM RNASTOT RNASAUD LNNAS AUDREP QUALIFIED ACCQUAL PAYT FRIENDLY TOEHOLD MULTIPLE DE ROE MB TGTSIZE 
PREM 1 .069 .069 .130*** 0.080* -.113** .062 .181** 0.033*** .019 .044 .064 .003 -.047 .135*** 
RNASTOT .029 1 1.000*** .766*** .147*** -.038 -.007 -.013 -.037 .005 .012 .047 .101** .015 .187*** 
RNASAUD -.018 .777*** 1 .766*** .147*** -.038 -.007 -.013 -.037 .005 .012 .047 .101** .015 .187*** 
LNNAS .076 .715*** .413*** 1 .327*** -.089** 0.081* .053 -.005 -.030 .006 .221*** .172*** -.011 .509*** 
AUDREP .098** .148*** .120*** .227*** 1 -0.072* .013 0.081* .022 0.071* .065 .029 0.071* -.061 .241*** 
QUALIFIED -0.086* -.034 -.024 -.059 -0.072* 1 -.085** -0.073* .067 -.036 .043 .015 -.224*** -.005 -.217*** 
ACCQUAL .030 -.030 -.020 -.007 -0.075* -.008 1 .024 -.011 -.033 .003 .038 .278*** .048 .199*** 
PAYT .150*** -.016 -.013 .028 0.081* -0.073* .024 1 .019 .141*** 0.080* 0.080* .024 -.107** -.017 
FRIENDLY .031 -.037 -.001 -.011 .022 .067 -0.071* .019 1 .150*** -.180*** 0.073* 0.078* .005 .018 
TOEHOLD -.028 -.012 -.011 -.004 .047 -.030 .010 .101** 0.080** 1 -.109** .123*** -.017 -.007 -.041 
MULTIPLE .056 .000 -.019 -.009 .065 .043 -.039 0.080* -.180*** -.107** 1 .065 -.033 .023 0.079* 
DE .011 .034 .050 -.014 .036 .117*** -.006 -.034 .044 .031 -.031 1 0.082* .202*** .111*** 
ROE -.059 .041 .019 .060 .025 .015 .004 .007 .026 -.056 -.024 .147*** 1 .146*** .360*** 
MB -.032 -.002 .020 -.051 .032 .068 -.010 -.019 .017 .035 -.046 .493*** .067 1 .281*** 
TGTSIZE .049 .174*** .133*** .335*** .216*** -.191*** .024 -.036 .008 -.006 0.080* -.092** .058 -.063 1 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4 
Model of takeover premiums and auditor independence and quality: full sample 
Results of estimating model (1):  PREMi = i + 1AUDINDEPi + 2AUDREPi + 3QUALIFIEDi + 
4EARNQUALi + 5PAYTi + 6FRIENDLYi + 7TOEHOLDi + 8MULTIPLEi + 9DEi + 10ROEi + 
11MBi + 12TGTSIZEi + i. PREM is the BHAR over the event window (-60,+30) days around the 
takeover announcement.  Auditor independence (AUDINDEP) is measured using three variables taking 
fee data collected for the year preceding the takeover announcement: RNASTOT is the ratio of NAS 
fees to total fees, RNASAUD is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural logarithm 
of NAS fees.  AUDREP is a binary variable highlighting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED 
is an indicator variable noting target firms that received a qualified audit report for the financial year prior to 
the takeover, PAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is exclusively cash, FRIENDLY is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if the directors recommend bid acceptance and MULTIPLE is an indicator variable 
set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target firm.  TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the 
bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover.  The following variables are measured 
for the financial year-end before the bid announcement: EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow from 
operations to net profit after tax, TGTSIZE is the target firm’s market capitalisation, DE is the target firm’s 
debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target firm’s return on equity ratio and MB is the target firm’s market-to-
book ratio.  t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 








































































































Adjusted R2 0.0255 0.0260 0.0281 0.0305 
F-stat 2.298*** 2.326*** 2.433** 2.564*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level                          ** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5 
Model of takeover premiums and auditor independence and quality partitioned 
by the attitude of the target board to the takeover 
Results of estimating model (1):  PREMi = i + 1AUDINDEPi + 2AUDREPi + 3QUALIFIEDi + 
4EARNQUALi + 5PAYTi + 6TOEHOLDi + 7MULTIPLEi + 8DEi + 9ROEi + 10MBi + 
11TGTSIZEi + i separately for takeovers where the target board recommends acceptance (Panel A) and 
rejection (Panel B). PREM is the BHAR over the event window (-60,+30) days around the takeover 
announcement.  Auditor independence (AUDINDEP) is measured using three variables taking fee data 
collected for the year preceding the takeover announcement: RNASTOT is the ratio of NAS fees to total 
fees, RNASAUD is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural logarithm of NAS fees.  
AUDREP is a binary variable highlighting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED is an indicator 
variable noting target firms that received a qualified audit report for the financial year prior to the takeover, 
PAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is exclusively cash, and MULTIPLE is an indicator 
variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target firm.  TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of 
the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover.  The following variables are 
measured for the financial year-end before the bid announcement: EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow 
from operations to net profit after tax, TGTSIZE is the target firm’s market capitalisation, DE is the target 
firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target firm’s return on equity ratio and MB is the target firm’s market-
to-book ratio.  t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
































































































Adjusted R2 0.0075 0.0091 0.0088 0.0113 
F-stat 1.213 1.261 1.250 1.323 
*** Significant at the 1% level** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10%level 
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Table 5 - continued 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
































































































Adjusted R2 0.0571 0.0566 0.0583 0.0610 
F-stat 2.588*** 2.572*** 2.621*** 2.701*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6 
Model of takeover premiums and auditor independence and quality partitioned by 
announcement before and after publicised audit failures 
Results of estimating model (1):  PREMi = i + 1AUDINDEPi + 2AUDREPi + 3QUALIFIEDi + 
4EARNQUALi + 5PAYTi + 6FRIENDLYi + 7TOEHOLDi + 8MULTIPLEi + 9DEi + 10ROEi + 
11MBi + 12TGTSIZEi + i separately for takeovers from 1996-2001 (Panel A) and 2001-2006 (Panel B).  . 
PREM is the BHAR over the event window (-60,+30) days around the takeover announcement.  
Auditor independence (AUDINDEP) is measured using three variables taking fee data collected for the 
year preceding the takeover announcement: RNASTOT is the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, RNASAUD 
is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural logarithm of NAS fees.  AUDREP is a 
binary variable highlighting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED is an indicator variable noting 
target firms that received a qualified audit report for the financial year prior to the takeover, PAYT is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is exclusively cash, FRIENDLY is an indicator variable set to 
1 if the directors recommend bid acceptance and MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are 
multiple bidders for the target firm.  TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target 
at the announcement of the takeover.  The following variables are measured for the financial year-end 
before the bid announcement: EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow from operations to net profit after tax, 
TGTSIZE is the target firm’s market capitalisation, DE is the target firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the 
target firm’s return on equity ratio and MB is the target firm’s market-to-book ratio.  t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 








































































































Adjusted R2 0.1354 0.1369 0.1347 0.1364 
F-stat 5.370*** 5.428*** 5.343*** 5.409*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6 - continued 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 








































































































Adjusted R2 0.0307 0.0299 0.0311 0.0298 
F-stat 0.654 0.636 0.663 0.634 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
